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Chapter 1
Introduction: An Oblique Perspective 
on Research Misconduct
1.1  Research Misconduct Novels and Integrity Challenges 
in Science
Research misconduct (fabricating, falsifying or plagiarising research, also known 
as FFP),1 has become an object of concern, not only for scientists and scholars, but 
also for managers, funders and publishers of research (Fanelli 2009; European 
Science Foundation 2010; Drenth 2010; Horbach and Halffman 2016). FFP and 
other “questionable research practices” (QRP) are discussed in various types of 
discourse, such as reports, guidelines and codes of conduct, but also in a plethora of 
scholarly publications, ranging from empirical studies (often from a sociology of 
science or scientometrics perspective) via normative and/or conceptual analyses 
(often from a science ethics or philosophy of science perspective) up to editorials. 
This monograph proposes to study research misconduct from a somewhat different, 
oblique perspective, namely by analysing research misconduct novels, i.e. novels 
about contemporary research practices, focussing on FFP, but against the backdrop 
of a more extended research integrity landscape. Such novels, I will argue, help us 
to understand, but also to open-up and broaden the issues involved. They often 
entail a multidimensional approach, focussing on individual experiences, but sensi-
tive to the wider systemic context, allowing us to study research misconduct from 
multiple viewpoints and to see the current wave of scientific misconduct delibera-
tions as symptomatic for fundamental transformations in the ways in which knowl-
edge is currently produced and valued. As Lex Bouter (former Rector and now 
professor of methodology and integrity at the Free University of Amsterdam) phrases 
it, “Scientists are exposed to temptations and … it would make a wonderful theme 
for an exciting movie or a compelling book. The novel is perhaps the best form for 
investigating the essence of what scientists do, and why they do it” (Bouter 2015, 
p. 148).
1 https://ori.hhs.gov/definition-misconduct
2In my experience, a significant part of standard “misconduct discourse” tends to 
be fairly repetitive and predictable, notably because researchers and their work “are 
usually treated very much as an abstraction, removed from the time and place of the 
local laboratory situation and with strong emphasis on formal aspects” (Miedema 
2012, p. 71). Many contributors therefore try to open up alternative, bottom-up per-
spectives. My approach to the integrity crisis analyses a series of literary case stud-
ies from a continental philosophical perspective, using Lacanian psychoanalysis as 
my frame of reference. Both dimensions (the literary case study as well as the con-
tinental psychoanalytical perspective) require some introduction.
First of all, to strengthen the quality and relevance of the discourse, it is impor-
tant to combine proximity (i.e. input from actual research practices) with critical 
distance and reflection. For that reason, many contributors to the research miscon-
duct debate opt for a case study approach, as exemplified for instance by David 
Goodstein’s Cautionary tales from the front lines of science (2010), written by a 
physics researcher who later became a research administrator at Caltech. His book 
focusses on a series of real life cases (“tales”) in which the author had been “person-
ally involved during his career” (p. xi). Although likewise opting for a case studies 
approach, my case studies will be science novels, so that this monograph can be 
seen as part of the “literature and science movement” (Peterfreund 1990; Caudill 
2011). But whereas many contributions to “science and literature studies” focus on 
popular images of scientists and science in the public realm, I rather use science 
novels as windows into actual research practices, as imaginative laboratories for 
probing the epistemological and ethical quandaries of technoscience. Science nov-
els, also known as “lablit” (Rohn 2006; Rohn 2010) or “campus literature” (Miedema 
2012, p.  74), purport to describe research dilemmas or questionable practices 
emerging in contemporary scientific settings in a convincing and realistic manner 
(Caudill 2011, p. 3; Zwart 2014a, p. 1). Moreover, I regard literary case studies as 
case histories, using a novel as a Fallgeschichte in the psychoanalytic sense of the 
term. Integrity issues emerging in science novels will be addressed from a 
“European” (Huxtable and ter Meulen 2015) or “continental” perspective. 
Continental philosophy (dialectics, phenomenology, psychoanalysis, etc.) of sci-
ence may contribute to a critical diagnostics of the techno-scientific present (Zwart 
et al. 2016), a conviction which is also endorsed by the Library of Ethics and Applied 
Philosophy in which this volume is published.2
Seven FFP novels have been selected for this purpose,3 namely: Arrowsmith by 
Sinclair Lewis (1925), The affair by C.P. Snow (1960), Cantor’s dilemma by Carl 
Djerassi (1989), Perlmann’s Silence by Pascal Mercier (1995), Intuition by Allegra 
Goodman (2006), Solar by Ian McEwan (2010) and Derailment by Diederik Stapel 
(2012). Although Derailment is actually an autobiographical case study (which 
“reads like a novel”), my reasons for including this ego-document will be explained 
2 http://www.springer.com/series/6230
3 My analyses of Arrowsmith, Perlmann’s Silence and Solar are revised versions of previous pub-
lications (Zwart 2015b, 2016c). A list of scientific misconduct novels can be found at the website 
of the Netherlands Research Integrity Network (https://www.nrin.nl/library/books/fiction).
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3in more detail in Chap. 11. These novels offer intriguing windows into contempo-
rary research practices and may be regarded as imaginative laboratories for explor-
ing the various ethical, philosophical and psychological dimensions involved. They 
allow us to develop a more comprehensive view of integrity challenges emerging in 
the contemporary academic research landscape.
To each of these case studies a separate chapter has been devoted. In addition, 
some other examples of literary documents concerning research integrity and mis-
conduct will be discussed in the introductory chapters of this monograph. These 
introductory analyses will allow me to develop my methodology and explore the 
terrain. They include some fairly recent novels, such as Limitless (2001/2011) by 
Allan Glynn (discussed below), but also historical examples discussed in Chaps. 3 
and 4, namely Hamlet by Shakespeare (1600), Carmen by Prosper Mérimée 
(1845/1965), An Enemy of the People by Henrik Ibsen (1882/1978), Dr. Ox’s 
Experiment by Jules Verne (1872/1875) and The Man who would be God by Haakon 
Chevalier (1959).
In terms of conceptual framework, these literary documents (the seven literary 
FFP case studies in combination with the five introductory readings) will be anal-
ysed and assessed from a Lacanian perspective. Whereas mainstream ethical discus-
sions tend to focus either on FFP infractions by individual researchers or on solutions 
(optimal or more acceptable scenarios for addressing the integrity challenges at 
hand), a Lacanian reading emphasises that the individuals involved often face more 
fundamental and devastating forms of crisis, which available codes and guidelines 
fail to address and for which available norms and concepts fail to provide credible 
or workable solutions.
Lacan grafted his theories on multiple precursors (standing on the shoulders of 
multiple others), but Hegelian dialectics and Freudian psychanalysis stand out as his 
most decisive sources of inspiration. From a Hegelian perspective, integrity dilem-
mas challenge our basic normative and epistemological convictions in a very funda-
mental way, often revealing the one-sidedness and naivety of the very principles 
from which we started. From a Freudian-psychoanalytical perspective, moreover, 
scientific research emerges as an “impossible profession” (Freud 1925/1948; Freud 
1937/1950). Researchers are spurred on by demanding but often conflicting impera-
tives and may easily become tormented subjects, driven by a pervasive desire to 
know, but challenged and frustrated by intractable, disconcerting or even toxic 
objects, as well as by the increasingly compelling expectations of the knowledge 
production system (the scientific super-ego). Special attention will be given to the 
paradoxes and tensions of what Lacan refers to as “university discourse”. Thus, the 
basic objective of this monograph is to explain how a close reading of research 
misconduct novels (as a “genre of the imagination”) may add depth, detail and even 
realism to the current conceptual and normative quandaries of integrity discourse.
1.1  Research Misconduct Novels and Integrity Challenges in Science
41.2  Between Two Worlds: From Plato’s Cave to Emile Zola’s 
Experimental Novel
This effort to initiate a dialogue between scientific research practices on the one 
hand and science novels on the other positions itself against the backdrop of a long 
history of reflection on the relationship between rationality and imagination. The 
cradle of this debate is Plato’s famous simile of the cave: a paradoxical story (or 
imaginative experiment) intended to demonstrate that an insurmountable epistemo-
logical rupture separates story-telling from rational inquiry. The simile (incorpo-
rated in Plato’s magnum opus: Republic, Book VII) involves a group of humans, 
dwelling in a subterranean cavern, whose legs and necks are fettered from child-
hood, so that they can only stare at the wall in front of them (Plato 1935/2000, 
514–518). A fire is burning higher up, at a distance behind them, and between the 
fire and the prisoners a low wall has been built, and behind that wall human images 
and shapes of humans and animals are carried about, as in puppet-shows, whose 
shadows are cast onto the wall. Moreover, Plato also mentions revolving triangular 
wooden devices (περίακτοι), used in ancient Greek drama for displaying (and rap-
idly changing) theatre scenes (518C).
 
At a certain point, one of the prisoners is freed from his chains and dragged away 
towards the light. He is literally “educated” (from educere: to lead out) and “con-
verted” away from the world of stories, images and opinions (δόξα) up to the world 
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shifting device (περίακτος) is turned towards the light. Notably, the former prisoner 
is initiated into astronomy and cosmology. He begins his academic career by gazing 
at the stars and the moon at night, not yet sufficiently habituated to withstand the 
painful, glittering light of the sun itself. Emancipation (enlightenment) is a trau-
matic experience, a birth trauma, an intellectual awakening.
In Plato’s scene we may discern the contours of a Palaeolithic facility for keeping 
domesticated humans: a domesticated human “herd” as Plato phrases it in another 
dialogue (Politikos), hypnotized and entranced by the moving images projected on 
a screen: a Flintstone-like cinema based on pyro-technology (Zwart 2010). But per-
haps we may also see it as an anticipatory vision of passengers on a transatlantic 
flight. The simile adheres to a three-step procedure in which three moments can be 
distinguished. Initially (M1), the cave-dwellers seem perfectly at home in their 
world of images and stories: their prehistoric, cinematic womb. The second moment 
(M2) is a situation of increased intensity and tension: the (involuntary) liberation 
from the cave, a negation (dialectically speaking) of the comfortable world of opin-
ion (δόξα), an experience of struggle and emancipation. But it also introduces a 
basic contradiction or rupture into the lives of the individuals involved, as well as 
into human culture as such, namely between the rational and the narrative (or imagi-
native) realm.
This contradiction can only be overcome (sublated, dialectically speaking) by 
constructing a rational world-view (→M3), allowing us to replace the traditional 
mythological cosmology of the initial cave scene by a more advanced and compre-
hensive view, in which the newly acquired research-based experiences are incorpo-
rated. This worldview builds on rational components, but complemented by 
(enlightened) imagination, so that the rational, but fragmentary knowledge compo-
nents are coagulated into an encompassing vision. This third moment (M3) can be 
discerned in another tale by Plato, told towards the end of Republic (Book X, 614–
621), about a soldier named Er who was slain in battle, a story that was later retold 
(in a slightly adapted version) by Cicero in his Somnium Scipionis (“Scipio’s 
dream”), the final chapter of his treatise De re publica (Cicero 1928; Zwart 2012). 
Er’s body is already deposited on a funeral pyre, ready to be burned, when he sud-
denly revives to tell the story of his journey through space which, besides an account 
of divine judgement and the rebirth of souls, contains a vision of the Platonic cos-
mos. His soul, unchained (released from earthly existence) enters and floats through 
heavenly regions, as a detached, disembodied astronomer as it were, discerning the 
supra-lunar cosmos, consisting (in Cicero’s version) of nine spheres: the sphere of 
the supreme deity, of the stars, of Saturn, of Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury 
and the moon. The sounds produced by the impetus and movement of the spheres 
(in Plato’s version: by Sirens standing on the rims of the celestial circles, borne 
around in revolution, uttering one single note, 617B) is audible as a celestial sym-
phony. The story not only conveys a model of the universe, but actually represents a 
dialectical synthesis of rational inquiry and (astronomically-informed) imagination 
(M3).
1.2  Between Two Worlds: From Plato’s Cave to Emile Zola’s Experimental Novel
6But this was written long ago and science has evolved into a modern, decidedly 
experimental and technology-driven phenomenon. The term scientist is of recent 
origin in fact, coined in the nineteenth century by Whewell (Ross 1962). How to 
envision the relationship between rationality and imagination under modern condi-
tions? In his treatise The Experimental Novel (1880/1923), Emile Zola determines 
the relationship between experimental research and literary imagination in a dif-
ferent manner. Zola’s ambition as a novelist was to move away from the romantic 
novel of the early nineteenth century and to produce a different genre: the realistic, 
physiological, or naturalistic novel: science-compatible as it were. Le Ventre de 
Paris [The Fat and the Thin] for instance is a novel which reflects the physiology 
of digestion. For Zola, a basic rupture between science and literary imagination (as 
suggested in Plato’s simile) does not exist. After reading the influential textbook 
Introduction to the Study of Experimental Medicine by physiologist/vivisectionist 
Claude Bernard (1865/1966), Zola concludes that novels are basically laboratories 
and adhere to an experimental design. Protagonists are basically research subjects 
exposed to various challenges (i.e. experimental conditions) and the question is: 
how will they respond (given their background, temperament, psychic characteris-
tics, physiology, etc.) to the stimuli, the environmental factors that are consciously 
manipulated by the experimental author? Indeed, even the literary characters 
themselves conduct experiments upon one another. According to Zola, such an 
approach will put the art and practice of novel-writing on a scientific footing. 
Rather than describing the world as it presents itself to us, experimental novelists 
actively intervene, in order to expose their characters to specific circumstances and 
events. The novel is a laboratory where social phenomena may be analysed accu-
rately and systematically. Naturalistic novels must therefore display the same mea-
sure of detachment and precision as scientific research reports (Zwart 2008a, 
2014a).
Again, a three-step (dialectical) dynamics can be discerned in Zola’s argument. 
Initially, readers feel perfectly at home in romantic stories, which convey a roman-
ticized (imaginary) view of the world (M1). Romantic novels are like Plato’s puppet 
shows, projected onto the wall of the socio-cultural cave, hypnotising their audi-
ence. The intrusion of the scientific style of thinking allows us to escape from this 
“prison”, so that a rupture is introduced between two worlds or cultural realms: the 
world of experimental research and the world of romantic fantasy and imagination 
(M2). This rupture can be overcome (“sublated”), however, in the form of the experi-
mental novel, combining the experimental method of modern science with the pow-
ers of literary imagination (M3), adding realism and relevance to both and allowing 
us the address the complexities of human socio-cultural existence on a more 
advanced level of understanding. In short: novel-writing as the science of every-day 
societal existence. To reach this plateau, Zola argues, novelists must familiarise 
themselves with scientific research, by reading scientific textbooks and attending 
scientific lectures, so as to acquaint themselves with the logic of the experimental 
method.
The literary documents that will be analysed in this monograph all reflect the 
experimental design. In each case, the key protagonist (a scholar or scientist) is 
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by certain technological innovations for instance), or to a frustrating epistemologi-
cal obstacle. These novelties or obstacles function as literary stimuli, and the sci-
ence novel basically describes and analyses the protagonist’s responses. In fact, a 
science novel entails two types of experiments. In the first place, it describes scien-
tific experiments as the core activity of laboratory life, conducted with the help of 
research equipment and focussed on viruses, microbes, model organisms, human 
research subjects, and so on. But the second experiment involves the researchers 
themselves, who now become research subjects as well, exposed to existential chal-
lenges and disruptive disturbances. In science novels, the experiment evolves into a 
case history, a Fallgeschichte in the psychoanalytical sense of the term, bridging the 
gap between experimental practice and narrative discourse (M3).
In terms of conceptual framework, the literary documents studied in this mono-
graph (the seven FFP case histories plus the introductory readings concerning 
research integrity in a somewhat broader sense) will be analysed from a Lacanian 
perspective, building on Freudian psychoanalysis and Hegelian dialectics. Before 
introducing the basic Lacanian framework as such (in Chap. 2), I will therefore first 
outline Lacan’s two major sources of intellectual inspiration, starting with Hegelian 
dialectics and subsequently proceeding to Freudian psychoanalysis.
1.3  Hegelian Dialectics and the Hwang Case
Dialectics refers to a (“continental”) philosophical method which was developed by 
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), but inspired by ancient (Socratic) and 
medieval (scholastic) traditions4 and further developed by more recent authors 
(including Jacques Lacan, but also for instance Slavoj Žižek). Dialectics builds on 
the conviction that a dialectical logic (λόγος) can be discerned in the history of 
human thinking, which not only allows us to come to terms with and understand the 
present (against the backdrop of an extended historical past), but also to anticipate 
(and actively contribute to the unfolding of) the emerging future. In other words, 
dialectics combines intellectual with practical ambitions: it not only entails reflec-
tion and self-reflection, but also praxis and engagement (options for action).
The logic of dialectics builds on series of trichotomies: triadic patterns or 
sequences of moments, which will be referred to here as M1, M2 and M3. Indeed, I 
already employed this dialectical pattern in my concise analyses of Plato’s dialogue 
and Zola’s essay above. A first example of a dialectical understanding of research 
misconduct may be the following. Initially, we seem to have a clear (albeit abstract) 
4 The Summa Theologica by Thomas Aquinas may count as an exemplification of medieval dialec-
tics. Each article starts with an initial conviction: Videtur (it seems to be the case that…, M1), 
which is subsequently challenged: Sed contra est (M2), so that a tension unfolds between contra-
dictory positions, leading up to a more robust conclusion, on a higher level of comprehensiveness 
(M3).
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(M1). But as soon as researchers become actively involved in concrete research 
practices (as soon as they really become entangled in the vicissitudes of laboratory 
life), things may prove not as transparent and unequivocal as was initially expected. 
Contradictions and anomalies begin to emerge, involving tensions between codes of 
conduct and actual practices, between “backstage” and “frontstage”, between the 
“context of discovery” (the daily research activities in which researchers are actu-
ally involved) and the “context of justification” (a cleansed and standardised version 
of their methods and results, as reported in academic papers, suggesting a straight-
forward trajectory leading from question and hypothesis via experiment to conclu-
sion). In their efforts to apply the formal procedures of the scientific method to 
concrete situations, researchers inevitably experience the recalcitrance and messi-
ness of the complex realities they purport to study (M2). The empirical cycle, neatly 
described in methodological textbooks, begins to hamper and researchers may 
experience all kinds of compromising frustrations. Real research may seem chaotic 
and deficient in comparison with the normative methodological ideal. Theoretical 
expectations (hypotheses) are confronted with instances of “negation”, and it may 
prove impossible to replicate initial results. Even the conceptual framework or 
research methodology as such may become challenged.
Gradually, however, researchers will realise that this actually constitutes a cru-
cial, inevitable and formative experience; that these frustrations and complications 
contribute to the Bildung process, the socialisation and edification of the scientists 
involved. In the long run, such problematic experiences may strengthen the robust-
ness of their approach. The scientists’ “metal” is being tested, and these frustrations 
and disappointments are an inevitable part of being in science, basic predicaments 
of the scientific profession as such. Challenges may then be redefined as opportuni-
ties, allowing scientists to transform (“sublate”) their initial (abstract) conception of 
the scientific method into a genuine understanding of what research is about (reality- 
compatible as it were, and building on experience). Thus, they have reached a higher 
level of comprehension and performance (in dialectical terms: the “negation of the 
negation”), where abstract methodological standards evolve into robust research 
practices as part of a viable epistemological culture, or Sittlichkeit as Hegel phrases 
it, so that formal standards and actual practices (which at a certain point seemed to 
contradict one another) may become reconciled, in the context of best practices 
(M2 → M3). In order to reach this “third moment”, however, researchers have to 
expose themselves to and work through the painful experiences of the “second 
moment”, so that actual empirical research constitutes an important experience 
(food for reflection). But all this requires effort, labour and perseverance, and in real 
life, as obstacles and anomalies begin to accumulate, this “third” moment may 
prove horrendously difficult to attain (M2 → | M3).
Instead of facing these challenges, inevitably involved in real-life research prac-
tices, researchers (“subjects” of science) may become reluctant to expose them-
selves to the multiple tensions and frustrations emerging within the “context of 
discovery”. They may deplore the various problematic aspects of actual research 
practices to such an extent that they abstain from committing themselves to this 
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tions (keeping their hands and conscience clean), retreating into abstract, theoretical 
reflections about how the world should be, or sticking to the predictable, stan-
dardised and repetitive pathways of normal science. This is what Hegel refers to as 
the position of the beautiful soul (schöne Seele): the desire to avoid dirty hands at 
all costs, which Hegel considers a form of hypocrisy and deflection. In order for the 
scientific method to realise itself, the confrontation with concrete research practices 
(frustrating as this may be, even compromising at times) is unavoidable.
Another possibility, emerging in this force field of concrete research practices, is 
to opt for the short-cut, the aberration, in other words: misconduct as a desperate 
effort to release the tension between what the subjects involved actually manage to 
achieve and what is expected of them. From a dialectical perspective, all individual 
scientists, left to their own devices, are potential frauds. Every scientific individual 
feels haunted by the superego of science, by the harsh and apparently “impossible” 
expectations entailed in the scientific method: a position of tension and conflict 
which Hegel refers to as “morality” (M2). Yet, for Hegel, the only genuine solution 
is to move from this situation of chronic tension on the individual level (i.e. tension 
between the formal normative standards of proper conduct on the one hand and the 
practical problems and limited possibilities of concrete research projects on the 
other) towards the development of a collective practice, where this tension is sub-
lated by Bildung, by developing practices of virtue, giving rise to a culture of self- 
reflection, where proper conduct is facilitated, encouraged and institutionalised, a 
situation which Hegel refers to as Sittlichkeit (M3).
Allow me to use a well-known example (a case history of research misconduct) 
to elucidate the dialectical approach. On 12 March 2004 the prominent South- 
Korean scientist Woo-Suk Hwang announced that he had succeeded in cloning 
human stem cells (Hwang et al. 2004). Western commentators regarded Hwang’s 
publication as evidence that South-Korea and other countries in the Far East (the 
“Wild” East) were quickly evolving into scientific “superpowers” (science tigers) 
notably because, compared to their Western competitors, they were much less ham-
pered by ethics committees and ethical constraints (Zwart 2008b). To put it in liter-
ary terms: for Western researchers, Hwang acted as a foil, reflecting and highlighting 
the frustrations involved in the plethora of ethical regulations and constraints they 
were facing.
Soon, however, rumours began to emerge, notably concerning the claim that 
Hwang had recruited his female Ph.D. students to act as egg donors, a highly ques-
tionable research practice, raising serious concerns regarding health risks, gender 
issues, power relationships and the voluntary nature of the donation. In fact, a com-
petition between two top journals evolved. Whereas Hwang and his team had pub-
lished their paper in Science, many of the subsequent rumours and concerns were 
voiced in Nature. And things became even more dramatic when Hwang was forced 
to admit that his findings had been fabricated, so that his papers had to be retracted 
(Kennedy 2006; Gottweis and Triendl 2006). His name became associated, not with 
a major breakthrough, but with a highly visible case of fraud.
1.3  Hegelian Dialectics and the Hwang Case
10
In this case study, the three dialectical moments are easily discernible. Initially, 
scientific ambitions and ethics requirements seem to go quite well together (M1), for 
in his Science paper, Hwang and his co-authors assure their readership of the ethical 
soundness of their research, stressing that it had been done in compliance with ethi-
cal rules and standards. Notably, they state that “before beginning any experiments 
we obtained approval for this study from the Institutional Review Board on Human 
Subjects Research” (Hwang et al. 2004, 1669). Wang also stressed that donors had 
donated oocytes and cumulus cells voluntarily, and that they had been “fully aware 
of the scope of our study and signed an informed consent form” (idem). Initially, 
this concordance of research and research ethics seemed something to be expected. 
Qualities such as veracity, reliability, conscientiousness, carefulness, responsibility, 
transparency, etc. are not only regarded as moral virtues, but also as important 
ingredients of proper scientific research, as crucial methodological skills. In other 
words, scientific research is initially presented as an inherently moral practice, con-
ducted in a conscientious manner, and directed at addressing important societal con-
cerns (the potential societal relevance of stem cell research, for instance in the 
context of transplantation medicine, where stem cells could be employed to replace 
faltering organs). Indeed, Hwang claimed that his breakthrough could have impor-
tant clinical implications, that it was likely to have a major impact for the war 
against degenerative disorders such as diabetes and Parkinson’s disease (Hwang 
et al. 2004).
But as soon as critics and sceptics began to take a closer look at the way in which 
the research was actually conducted, in other words: at the backstage rather than the 
frontstage of the research, at the context of discovery rather than the context of jus-
tification, things proved to be much less smooth (M2). Remarkable tensions came 
into view between ethical requirements on the one hand and actual research prac-
tices on the other, for instance concerning the way in which the stem cells (oocytes) 
had been procured. The research proved to be decidedly unethical. It represented a 
negation or violation of ethical standards (M2). The actual experiments contradicted 
(Western?) requirements. Moreover, the Hwang case revealed that the global arena 
of stem cell research is actually a highly competitive landscape, involving fierce 
competition, between top journals for instance (Nature versus Science) but also 
between global regions (the West versus the Far East). Comments included the con-
cern that in the West, scientific progress was delayed and frustrated by research 
ethics and distrust in science (technophobia), whereas in the East scientific progress 
was encouraged by a science-friendly climate and a supportive cultural environ-
ment, including well-funded laboratories and legislation that permitted cloning of 
human embryos for research. Again, Hwang acted as a foil for highlighting some of 
the challenges Western researchers were facing. In other words, the Hwang case not 
only reflected ethical issues, but also pointed to conflicts of power, between princi-
pal investigators (such as Hwang) and early stage researchers (his female Ph.D.’s), 
as well as between the scientific establishment (Nature as an elite scientific forum) 
and the newly emerging Asian scientific “tigers” (including South Korea).
Finally, however, Hwang’s exposure and downfall resulted in another remarkable 
dialectical turn (M2 → M3). Now it was argued that “Sound ethics and good research 
practice go hand in hand…”, that ethics is not a nuisance but an indispensable 
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 infrastructure for quality management and science governance (cf. Zwart 2008b). 
Indeed, “good governance is crucial for research… Absence of regulation is not 
beneficial for research… Regulatory oversight adds another layer to the web of 
quality control in research” (Gottweis and Triendl 2006). In other words, in this 
third round of comments, the ethical infrastructure was suddenly regarded as an 
integral part of excellence in science: “Have your ethics in place!” In dialectical 
terms: on a more advanced level of comprehension, science and ethics became rec-
onciled again. Both were acknowledged as complementary dimensions of good sci-
entific practice (academic Sittlichkeit). Hwang still functioned as a foil, but now for 
highlighting the (self-perceived) ethical robustness of Western research practices.
From a macro-perspective, the Hwang case must be regarded as symptomatic for 
a broader, even global development. Frank Miedema (2012) professor of immunol-
ogy and Dean of the Medical Faculty of Utrecht University, distinguishes three 
stages in the recent history of science. Science 1.0 (M1, dialectically speaking) was 
a type of research that was autonomous and curiosity driven. Increasingly however, 
a different type of research seems called for (Science 2.0: M2), producing knowl-
edge that is relevant for societal stakeholders and entailing economic value 
(Miedema 2012, p. 24). This implies new (post-classical) quality criteria, but also 
growing tensions and contradictions between the inherent dynamics of academic 
work and the societal and economic expectations involved. But eventually, accord-
ing to the author, a situation of co-creation is evolving (→ M3), in which the ques-
tions and interests of science and society become more adequately aligned and 
knowledge production becomes coproduction: Science 3.0 (M3) (cf. Gibbons et al. 
1994; Nowotny et al. 2001; Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz 2001).
1.4  A Second Dialectical Exercise: The Limitless Case
This same dialectical schema can be discerned in research misconduct novels. 
Science novels provide podiums where dramatic dialectical scenarios are enacted, 
albeit not always resulting in a “happy” end (M3). The dialectical trichotomy 
(M1 → M2 → M3) allows us to grasp the basic dramatic structure reflected in mis-
conduct narratives. The first moment (M1) is comparable to what is often referred to 
as “exposition” (Freytag 1863). In the first chapters, we are introduced to the char-
acters and their socio-cultural ambiance. During the second moment (M2), the (con-
flicting) demands and challenges become apparent, as key protagonist are exposed 
to novelties (new forms of knowledge or technicity, now types of laboratory equip-
ment, new research targets, unexpected obstacles, etc.). The whole ambiance sud-
denly appears in a different light, as if the περίακτοι (the revolving triangular 
wooden devices of ancient Greek theatre) are turned around. Existing expectations 
and established behavioural repertoires prove insufficient, and this gives rise to ten-
sions, conflicts and frustrations. In dialectical terms, the initial expectations are 
negated by the challenges and contradictions emerging in real research. The one- 
sidedness (or even naivety) of the initial principles and convictions is exposed. Key 
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protagonists must learn to come to terms with and domesticate the challenge, but 
this also involves a re-consideration of the basic principles themselves: a collective 
re-education. This is the third moment (M3) of reflection, catharsis or denouement 
(when the περίακτοι are turned again). This trichotomy of moments determines the 
basic logic of misconduct narratives.
Take for instance the novel Limitless (Glynn 2001/2011), discussed in more 
detail elsewhere (Zwart 2014a). The protagonist (Eddie Morra, a literary author liv-
ing in Manhattan) has finally received his first book contract and seems about to 
realise his expectations and objectives (M1). Precisely at that moment, he faces a 
major challenge: a mid-life crisis, in the form of a paralysing writer’s block. The 
usual behavioural options (withdrawal into his studio, staring at his computer screen 
for hours, smoking, alcohol consumption, etc.) fail to work (M2) and, in despair, he 
yearns for a way out to by-pass the hazardous route of working through the crisis. 
Coincidentally, he meets a former drug dealer, now working for a pharmaceutical 
company engaged in illegal experiments (in the wild), who offers him a “solution” 
in the form of a novelty: a nootropic drug named MDT-48. The dealer’s job is to 
recruit early adopters (such as tormented authors) who are enrolled in unauthorised 
pre-clinical trials (so as to reduce the costs involved in developing marketable 
enhancement drugs). The protagonist takes the drug (reluctantly at first) and it 
works: he becomes a prolific author overnight. Apparently, the drug offers a short- 
cut, a panacea, so that he is suddenly able to overcome the paralysing tension 
between expectations and achievements.
The problem situation is not really sublated (aufgehoben) in the dialectical sense 
of the term, however, and the third moment is not really reached (M2 → | M3). Before 
long, side-effects begin to accumulate, symptomatic of the deficiency of the solu-
tion (brain doping). Besides suffering from memory loss and nausea, the protago-
nist becomes addicted to the drug, and MDT increasingly takes over his life. In 
accordance with the dual meaning of the Greek term for pharmaceuticals 
(φάρμακον), the drug (a bio-active, toxic, nootropic substance) is both a medicine 
and a poison. The tension between expectations and performance (M2) resurges, but 
now on a higher level of intensity. In the novel version, the protagonist dramatically 
fails to adequately address the challenge and in the end he proves utterly unable to 
“sublate” his problem (M2 → | M3). In the movie version, however, he apparently 
manages to domesticate the drug and to re-educate himself, in such a way that he is 
able to live on an optimal dose (increasing performance benefits while avoiding 
addiction and other drawbacks).
From a dialectical perspective, however, the movie outcome must still be 
regarded as suboptimal. The reconciliation between expectations and performance 
is not really achieved and the contraction is not really sublated (the negativity of the 
situation is not really negated). For although the individual apparently manages to 
survive (temporarily at least), his experiences are not really used to bring about a 
conversion, a metanoia, a systemic change, neither individually nor collectively. 
Notably, the misconduct committed by pharmaceutical companies and other mega- 
actors is neither exposed nor addressed, so that the problem continues, and new 
victims are likely to become trapped in similar scenarios.
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We may look at the novel from various perspectives, first of all from the perspec-
tive of knowledge. The designer drug reflects a neuro-centric view, both on human 
existence in general and on individual achievement in particular (M1), reducing the 
phenomena of artistic creativity to the flow of neurotransmitters in the brain. The 
Limitless experience (M2) urges us to question the naïve, one-sided conviction that 
we are our brains. The novel incites us to see human achievement rather as a dialec-
tical interplay between individual performance (and its neurological correlates) on 
the one hand and the broader systemic context (the socio-cultural environment or 
world) on the other. In Limitless this insight (that creativity can only be partially 
explained with the help of neurotransmitters and brain chemistry) is not really 
achieved however (M2 → | M3). The new designer drug (the materialisation of a new 
form of neuro-scientific and psycho-pharmaceutical expertise) remains one-sided 
and disruptive, both individually and more broadly, on the level of culture and soci-
ety. In the movie version, the power game played by the company, at the expense of 
individuals (early adopters, notably faltering artists) is neither criticised nor over-
come. Eddie the protagonist temporarily succeeds in outsmarting others, but a sus-
tainable moral practice (Sittlichkeit, M3) never develops. In other words, the 
neuro-centric starting-point (M1) is not really challenged and corrected (negated, 
“sublated”) in response to the dramatic Limitless experiment (M2). Various power 
games are enacted in the course of the trial (M2), but without overcoming the moral 
and epistemological deficiencies and deadlocks exposed by the novel. By relying on 
brain doping, the protagonist remains trapped within the logic of a toxic power 
game, rather than transcending and sublating it, so that the “happy end” remains a 
temporary, solitary and vulnerable one (M2 → | M3).
The difference between the novel version and the movie version of Limitless is 
quite telling in this respect. In the novel version, the protagonist is literally described 
as a research subject, a “guinea pig” (p. 244), a “human lab rat who was tagged and 
followed and photographed and then discarded” (340), so that the idea of the experi-
mental novel must be taken quite literally here. In the movie, however, the role of 
the pharmaceutical company, whose untested pharmaceutical products facilitate “a 
sudden and unexplained leap forward” in the early adopter’s career (p. 204), until 
disruptive side-effects and withdrawal symptoms begin to manifest themselves, 
blends into the background. The origin of the drug remains more or less unclear. 
Life is lived in the fast lane and experienced as highly competitive, while pharma-
ceutical innovations provide shortcuts to success. The protagonist persists in this 
neuro-centric and neoliberal view on what human existence is about (M1), rather 
than allowing the negativity of this viewpoint to be challenged and negated by his 
experiences. The strength of the novel, compared to the movie (from a dialectical 
perspective), is that the initial convictions are really called into question, on three 
levels, namely on the level of knowledge (the epistemic level), of power (the bio- 
political level) and of the Self (the ethical level). On the knowledge level, the novel 
challenges the neuro-centric view on human creativity, a view which frames society 
as a pharmaceutical laboratory where consumer responses to brain-chemicals can 
be tested by companies. On the level of power, the novel problematizes the unequal 
power relationship between pharmaceutical companies and consumers (early 
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 adopters) of designer drugs. And on the level of Self it becomes clear that the vari-
ous tensions and conflicts described by the novel can only be addressed when the 
challenges are really worked-through, so that egocentricity and opportunism (of 
individuals- as-entrepreneurs) give way to the development of a sustainable, collec-
tive, moral culture which is able to stand up to and domesticate the toxic novelty 
(M3).
These three dimensions or axes, namely knowledge (epistemology), power (bio- 
politics) and the Self (ethics) will assume a broader relevance in this study. They 
indicate three types of questions that may be asked concerning research misconduct, 
namely: Which new forms of knowledge (of scientific technicity) are emerging? 
How do they affect power relationships or established power regimes? And finally: 
What practices of the Self are developed in response to this challenge? These three 
axes of research (these three types of questions) have been distinguished by Michel 
Foucault (1984; cf. Zwart 2016c), but prove highly relevant for a dialectical 
approach as well. A dialectical process is unleashed when new forms of knowledge 
(epistemic novelties) emerge. In the case of Limitless, these novelties initially exem-
plify and reinforce a bio-molecular, neuro-centric view on human creativity, as we 
have seen, which is exposed by the novel (M1). In accordance with the neuro-centric 
viewpoint, experiences of stagnation and frustration (such as a writer’s block) are 
addressed with the help of substances like MDT-48, allegedly allowing the protago-
nist to modify his brain chemistry. A decidedly neuro-centric self-understanding is 
entailed in this scenario (M1). Rather than seeing ourselves as existing beings, as 
beings-in-the-world, MDT- 48 reinforces the conviction that we are our brain, that 
our brains are makeable and that our societal performance, our moods, our intelli-
gence, our productivity and our creativity are functions of a modifiable brain. In 
other words, rather than being the autonomous subjects of our performance, human 
beings become the targets of bio- molecular interventions.
As soon as this new type of biomolecular and psycho-pharmaceutical knowl-
edge, exemplified by the designer drug, enters the real world of socio-cultural infra-
structures, however, various kinds of tensions and conflicts emerge and various 
kinds of ambiguities are revealed. The psycho-pharmaceutical novelty produces 
disruptive power effects (M2). Although the protagonist enters a stellar career, he 
becomes increasingly dependent on the pharmacological substance, the miracle 
drug, provided by a powerful company which surveys and monitors his perfor-
mance, using him as a research subject in an informal (wild) trial. In the movie it is 
suggested that, in our increasingly competitive, high pace and information-dense 
societies, performativity can no longer be achieved without the use of nootropic 
drugs (brain doping), allowing us to enhance our moods and information-processing 
capacities. It is suggested that virtually all “high performers” (especially in com-
petitive environments such as Manhattan) are on MDT-like drugs. In other words, 
individuals become the targets of bio-power, of manipulation and surveillance by a 
Big Other.
But Limitless also has repercussions on the level of the Self. Psycho- 
pharmaceutical innovations are initially envisioned as instruments that allow us to 
realise certain goals which otherwise would be beyond our reach (in this case: novel 
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writing). Subsequently, however, the relationship between the (allegedly autono-
mous) Self on the one hand and the technological novelty on the other is bound to 
change. The subject (the protagonist) becomes increasingly dependent on his pill, 
his instrument (ὄργανον). His organism, his brain chemistry can no longer do with-
out. Moreover, his brain, his whole organism, becomes significantly and irreversible 
affected by (and addicted to) the drug. In other words, whereas initially the novelty 
(MDT-48) allegedly allowed the protagonist to become the manager of his brain, of 
his creativity, his moods, etc., gradually the designer drug becomes increasingly 
powerful and threatening. The protagonist no longer experiences himself as master 
over his own brain and the focus inevitably shifts to the question: how to domesti-
cate this drug? For the real agent of the novel seems to be the (colourless, almost 
immaterial) drug itself (in Lacanian algebra: the object a), drawing the protagonists 
into action.
Initially, moreover, all this seems a purely individual challenge (how to prevent 
or counter-act addiction, nausea, memory loss, etc.), but gradually it becomes clear 
that the domestication of MDT-48, exemplifying a whole new wave of psycho- 
pharmaceuticals, requires a socio-cultural transformation, the development of a new 
moral culture (Sittlichkeit, M3), sufficiently robust to withstand the massive intru-
sion of designer drugs. In other words, MDT-48 actually opens-up and reveals a 
whole world of contradictions and tension within highly advanced capitalism in 
which individuals struggle for survival. This raises the question whether more via-
ble (less drug-dependent) practices of the Self allow individuals to safeguard their 
autonomy and to contribute to a turn or conversion (μετάνοια) on the collective 
level of Sittlichkeit (M2 → M3).
The question for the protagonist therefore is how to constitute himself as an 
autonomous and responsible subject, vis-à-vis the biotechnological and bio- political 
challenges enacted in the novel. Whereas designer drugs allegedly allow individuals 
to manage their cognitive capabilities and moods, in the course of the narrative the 
question rather becomes reversed: how to manage, how to domesticate these prod-
ucts of neuro-biochemistry (allegedly benign, but actually quite toxic)? Initially, the 
basic objective of such drugs is to allow us to manage the bio-molecular processes 
occurring within our neural networks. But this entails a naïve, neuro-centric and 
instrumental view on technology. The new challenge is: how to domesticate com-
mercial neuro-biochemistry? The issue shifts from managing our brains to govern-
ing pharmaceutical industries, so that pharmaceuticals not only become 
bio-compatible (enhancing rather than disrupting our psychic well-being), but also 
socio-compatible (optimising rather than endangering daily existence and societal 
culture). Instead of being socially disruptive (via the intensification of drug- 
dependent competitiveness), new forms of neurological knowledge must be mobil-
ised in such a way that they may be used by us rather than the other way around. In 
Limitless, the designer drug is like a bio-technological (man-made) vampire virus, 
using human individuals as mere vehicles in order to proliferate and spread.
In other words, the designer drug operates as a socio-cultural infection. Agency 
increasingly shifts from human users to the super-pill itself. Containment of this 
infection can only be realised collectively, but Limitless describes a socio-cultural 
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landscape where this “third moment” (M3) remains decidedly out of reach. The 
question how to effectively domesticate designer drugs also applies to other “con-
verging” NBIC technologies (where NBIC stands for: nano-technologies, bio- 
technologies, information technologies and cognitive science). The question is not 
whether such novelties will either lead to empowerment of individuals or to 
increased drug-dependence, for the most likely scenario is: both. This is the paradox 
of the “second moment” (M2): the autonomy of the protagonist is seemingly 
strengthened, but actually it is a lure, because before long the subject becomes 
increasingly dependent on “his” drug. Increasingly, moreover, the designer drug 
affects the socio-cultural arena, seducing other potential consumers (use me!), 
occupying the position of agent addressing and seducing potential consumers 
(rather than being a mere instrument). The drug (a neuro-chemical substance) rep-
resents power-relationships moreover: a pharmaceutical company recruiting early 
adopters as informal research subjects, using their personal experiments are a source 
of information. With the help of the drug, the protagonist aims to restore performa-
tivity, but actually he becomes a research animal, a lab rat, while Manhattan as such 
becomes a neuro-pharmaceutical laboratory or test site. Before long, the pharma-
ceutical company knows more about Eddie’s brain than Eddie himself. Eventually, 
the gap between expectations and performance is intensified rather than bridged by 
the drug. The dialectical question therefore is how to restore Sittlichkeit on the 
macro-level: a moral culture or scaffold (M3) which enables individuals to survive 
exposure to such infectious, toxic substances; both enabling and building on viable 
practices of the Self. The development of such a culture presupposes that question-
able practices on the part of pharmaceutical companies (flooding the market with 
designer drugs, life-style drugs, anti-depressants, ADHD-drugs, etc.) is exposed and 
addressed (Dehue 2015). Let this suffice as a first example of how a novel (analysed 
from a dialectical perspective) may inform the debate. I will now turn to Lacan’s 
second source of inspiration, namely Freudian psychoanalysis.
1.5  Freud and Fraud
In discussions on research misconduct, Freud’s work may be addressed from mul-
tiple perspectives, for in the course of his career he played various roles, as a scien-
tific researcher, as a physician specialised in psychic afflictions, and as the 
founding-father of psychoanalysis.
Initially, Freud was a scientific expert: a neurologist trained at the University of 
Vienna who qualified as doctor of medicine in 1881 and became a specialist in the 
treatment of patients labelled as hysterics and neurotics. As a neurologist, he con-
tributed to what Jacques Lacan refers to as “university discourse” (a concept that 
will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter), notably via his neurological 
publications on aphasia and the brain.
Dialectically speaking one could argue that, as a researcher, and subsequently as 
a trained and qualified practitioner, Freud’s basic aim (on the level of knowledge) 
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was to contribute to the realisation and elaboration of the neuro-physiological 
world-view (M1); initially as a researcher involved in experimental work, but subse-
quently as a practitioner working outside academia and focussing on “neurological” 
afflictions such as hysteria and compulsion neurosis. Yet, inevitably, he encountered 
weird obstacles and experienced frustrations of various kinds (M2). On the knowl-
edge level, he faced tensions and contradictions between his epistemic convictions 
and his practical experiences. The latter seemed to challenge or even “negate” the 
neuro-physiological paradigm in which he was trained. In his efforts to deal with 
these complexities, he increasingly began to explore new terrains. In 1897 (the birth 
year of psychoanalysis), this resulted in a scene-change. The περίακτοι of his prac-
tice was reversed, as the laboratory setting had already given way to the famous 
Freudian couch. But rather than representing a deflection from his scientific convic-
tions, Freud consistently emphasised that he wanted to reconcile the two by address-
ing emerging therapeutic challenges in a scientific manner, so that the apparent 
tensions between neuro-physiology and psychopathology could be sublated (aufge-
hoben). Although his scientific convictions seemed to be negated by his experiences 
as a physician, his aim was to achieve a negation of the negation and to reconcile 
neuroscience and psychotherapeutic praxis (M3). He saw psychoanalysis as an 
extension of science and expected that, one day, psychoanalysis could be confirmed 
by (or even replaced by) endocrinological and neurological views (Freud 1920).
This dialectical schema mirrors Zola’s concept of the experimental novel dis-
cussed above. Freud likewise sets out to bridge the gap between the scientific and 
the literary world, between the novel (as a literary case history) and the experimen-
tal method (as a basic form of scientific experience), albeit starting at the opposite 
end. For whereas Zola was a literary author who recognised the possibilities of the 
scientific method, Freud was a scientist who recognised the relevance of belles- 
lettres. It has been observed that Freud’s case histories actually read like novels 
(Marcus 1974/1985). While Zola the novelist adopted experimental concepts and 
techniques in his literary writings, Freud at a certain point decided to employ nov-
elistic techniques to further develop his understanding of human psychic existence. 
Point of departure was a model of the human mind elaborated in an unpublished 
manuscript known as the Entwurf. In order to reconcile the tensions between his 
neuro-scientific theory (the Entwurf-model) and his psycho-therapeutic practice 
(M2), he not only began to analyse novels and theatre plays, but also actively began 
to write novel-like case histories himself (M2 → M3).
Thus, Freud developed a unique discursive practice, compared to standard uni-
versity discourse. Initially, Freud was a qualified expert who aimed to apply the 
theoretical and methodological requirements of the neuro-physiological paradigm 
to the empirical complexities of psychotherapeutic practice, but this proved an 
unsolvable challenge (M2 → | M3). In response to his fiasco, he moved away from 
explanation to interpretation, from causality to narrative, from science strictu sensu 
towards the humanities, realising a science-humanities dialogue. Freud-the- 
qualified-expert had been a neurologist who basically regarded the bodies and 
brains of human individuals as objects or targets of research. Freud-the- 
psychoanalyst, however, took a different perspective. Notably in his extended case 
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studies (Dora, the Ratman, etc.), the patients themselves are now given the floor as 
subjects and invited to articulate their inhibitions, fixations and desires, via free 
associations (automatic speaking) and transference. In other words, Freud as an 
author produced two different types of discourse: before the birth of psychoanalysis 
he published scientific papers (on aphasia and neuro-anatomy), but after the episte-
mological turn or rupture (occurring in 1897) he began to publish case histories, 
together with meta-psychological considerations based on them (from 1897 
onwards). And only his psychoanalytical output is included in the standard editions 
of his Gesammelte Werke or ‘complete’ works.
In his role as a professional expert (i.e. a neurologist who tried to extrapolate his 
convictions into psychotherapy, who tried to realise his science), Freud faced a 
number of integrity challenges. As a medical practitioner who became a psycho-
therapist, his dealings with patients were far from flawless, and some (questionable) 
activities have been amply documented, first and foremost by Freud himself. One of 
them concerns the so-called cocaine episode. In 1884, Freud developed an interest 
in possible medical applications of cocaine and published an article advocating the 
drug as a panacea (although he lost the race for priority against ophthalmologist 
Carl Koller, who demonstrated the surgical use of cocaine at an ophthalmological 
congress that same year; Gay 1988, p. 43). Meanwhile, Freud had started to use the 
drug himself, as a remedy against depression and impotence, and he recommended 
or prescribed it to a number of patients and friends. One of them was Ernst von 
Flieschl-Marxow, who quickly became addicted to it, so that the remedy actually 
exacerbated his sufferings. Cocaine proved a φαρμακόν: both remedy and poison. 
Other physicians reported that the drug (if subcutaneously injected, as Freud sug-
gested) could have rather unfortunate side effects. This troublesome episode dam-
aged his professional reputation and became a topic in his dream life. Some 
cocaine-related dreams are reported and analysed in The Interpretation of Dreams 
(1900/1942).
The most famous dream analysed by Freud, and the one that is generally regarded 
as the prototype of Freudian dream analysis, is Irma’s injection, a dream which 
likewise reflects embarrassing experiences as a medical practitioner. In this dream, 
which was dreamt on the night of July 23, 1895, Freud meets a former patient 
(pseudonym: Irma) who suffers from unexplainable symptoms. He asks her to open 
her mouth and peers curiously into her throat, where he notices a strange white spot. 
Three colleagues join the examination and after some deliberations they conclude 
that the suffering is caused by an iatrogenic infection, resulting from a (rather care-
lessly administered) injection with a “solution” named Trimethylamine, whose for-
mula appears before the dreamer’s eyes, printed in bold type. Freud’s subsequent 
interpretations reveal that the dream indeed addresses an instance of questionable 
professional practice. Via his dream, Freud argues, the dreamer (Freud) tried to 
exculpate himself at the expense of colleagues.
The practical experiences reflected in this dream are well known. In March 1895, 
Freud treated a young single woman named Emma Eckstein (27  years old) for 
 hysterical nose bleeds and called in the assistance of his friend Wilhelm Fliess, a 
nose and throat specialist (otolaryngologist) from Berlin, to examine her. Inspired 
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by idiosyncratic theories about the role of the nose in sexuality, Fliess operated on 
Irma’s nose on March 4, but this did not stop the bleeding. To make matters worse, 
a foetid odour set in. As profuse bleeding continued, Freud called in another sur-
geon who discovered that Fliess had left at least half a metre of gauze behind in the 
nasal cavity. In a letter to Fliess, Freud commented that it was an unfortunate acci-
dent that could have happened to the most careful surgeon. These instances of care-
lessness or even misconduct clearly troubled Freud and affected his dream life.
All these experiences were part of the transition period, when Freud was still 
combining his budding improvisations as a psychotherapist with biomedical inter-
ventions, such as cocaine injections and surgery. But the crucial, formative experi-
ence gained during this period (M2) was that neuro-physiological theory on the one 
hand and the realities of hysterical and neurotic suffering on the other seem impos-
sible to align in an adequate way, so that he eventually deflected (as a neuro- 
physiological apostate) into a fundamentally different kind of praxis: psychoanalysis, 
relying on extended, novel-like case histories, yet persisting in the expectation that 
eventually science and narratives, experimentation and interpretation would be rec-
onciled (→M3).
As a psychoanalyst, however, he again faced various integrity challenges, albeit 
of a different, textual nature. They were related to authorship and had to do with 
handling sensitive information. His shift from physical examination and biomedical 
intervention into interpretation and case study analysis is also reflected in the type 
of integrity dilemmas he is now facing, revolving around issues concerning the 
question whether it is admissible to publish sensitive, confidential information 
about patients in academic papers.
One relevant episode, from the point of view of research integrity, concerns the 
so-called Dora-case, the first extensive psychoanalytic case history published by 
Freud (1905/1942). The case study as such is an exemplification of psychoanalyti-
cal discourse. It is a Fallgeschichte which indeed reads like a “novel” (Marcus 
1974/1985),5 and the patient herself is given the floor as the key protagonist, while 
Freud acts as the narrator who (as one of the characters in this “novel”) narrates the 
story in retrospect. To this famous case study, however, a Preface is added, which is 
written in a somewhat different discursive mode. In this Preface, Freud poses as a 
professional doctor who writes about a patient and who discusses his moral dilemma 
concerning the confidentiality principle before an audience of medical colleagues 
(Zwart 1992, 2016b). From a literary perspective, this may be regarded as a “fram-
ing action” (Marcus 1974/1985, p. 67). In his Preface he admits to publishing this 
document (which contains a significant amount of intimate personal details con-
cerning his former patient) without the patient’s consent, arguing that patients would 
never opt for psychotherapeutic treatment if they suspected that confidentiality 
could thus be broken. Freud claims, moreover, that his duties as a scientist (to share 
his findings, so that future therapists and patients may profit from the insights 
5 Steven Marcus, reading Dora from the point of view of literary criticism, argues that Freud’s case 
study reads like a “modern experimental novel” (p. 64) and that he writes “exactly like a novelist” 
(p. 68).
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gained) have to be given more weight than his discretional duties towards single 
patients.
According to Freud, professional therapists find themselves in an impossible 
position, facing an insolvable integrity dilemma. When they refuse to provide details 
from their therapeutic practice, medical colleagues will complain that their theories 
are unfounded. But when the data are provided, these same colleagues argue that he 
should not have done this, in the light of the principle of confidentiality (p. 163). In 
other words, the expert is confronted with a clash between methodological norma-
tivity (always provide the necessary details in support of your theory) and ethical 
normativity (be a Victorian gentleman and treat confessions about intimacies made 
by patients, notably female patients, with the utmost discretion). But if he had asked 
his patient for her permission to publish such intimate details, she certainly would 
not have given it (p. 164). Moreover, Freud took care to conceal Dora’s identity, 
notably by using a pseudonym, but her identity was nonetheless discovered of 
course (cf. Kochiras 2006). Regardless of whether contemporary readers find 
Freud’s line of reasoning convincing (probably not), this Preface is written in a 
professional rather than a psychoanalytical vein, so that in terms of discursive mode 
it contrasts with the case history as such. The Preface is written by Freud-the- 
professional-expert, rather than by Freud-the-budding-psychoanalyst.
Other integrity aspects of Freud’s psychoanalytic practice have likewise aroused 
uneasiness or criticism. This includes reproaches concerning “therapeutic nihil-
ism”, meaning that, although psychoanalysis aims to foster self-understanding, it 
often fails to actually cure the patients from their psychic afflictions, notably because 
these afflictions tend to reflect fundamental entanglements with the socio-cultural 
environment as such, and are therefore seen as symptomatic of (Western) civilisa-
tion as a whole. But such criticism basically concerns Freud in his role as a profes-
sional, a therapist. In this introductory Chapter, the focus of attention is not in the 
practices of Freud-the-professional-expert (evidently questionable at times), but 
rather on the concepts and methodologies employed and on the insights gained by 
Freud-the-psychoanalyst, such as his concept of ‘impossible professions’.
1.6  Scientific Research as an Impossible Profession
One example of a concept coined by Freud-the-psychoanalyst that seems highly 
relevant for our purposes is the concept of “impossible professions” (Freud 
1925/1948; 1937/1950, p. 94). Reflecting on some questionable aspects of his per-
formance as a therapist in retrospect (such as the ones described above), Freud 
argues that his predicaments are attributable to the fact that therapy, together with 
pedagogy and governance, should count as an “impossible profession”. Given the 
basic tensions inherent in the practices concerned, unsatisfactory results are to be 
expected from the very outset.
Jacques Lacan subsequently extrapolated this concept to include scientific 
research as a fourth instance of an “impossible profession”. According to Lacan, 
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this notably applies to scientists who nowadays work with dangerous and poten-
tially toxic or infectious objects, such as nuclear energy or potentially dangerous 
bacterial strains. In view of the dilemmas involved, Lacan argues that researchers 
are struggling with a “crisis of anxiety” (1974/2005, p. 74). They are alarmed by the 
idea that dangerous life forms may one day escape from the laboratory, causing 
pandemics in the outside world, perhaps even cleansing the world from human 
beings. In some cases, this may cause researchers themselves to adopt a self-
imposed moratorium, as happened in the case of recombinant DNA research in the 
1970s (Berg et al. 1974; Zwart 2013). In other words, scientific research has become 
an “impossible profession” (Lacan 1974/2005, p. 73).
Dialectically speaking, this experience is part of the second moment (M2) of the 
dialectical unfolding: the moment of negation or negativity, when contradictions 
(the clash between the desire to know and the various constraints implied in the 
societal responsibilities of a scientist) may seem impossible to solve. Initially (M1) 
it seems evident that scientists work for the benefit of humankind and that scientific 
knowledge may be used to address societal issues. But gradually (M2) it becomes 
clear that science itself may become a danger, a problem, rather than a solution, 
because science itself may entail significant societal risks. Nonetheless, from a dia-
lectical perspective, it would be nihilistic to conclude that this experience (relevant 
as it is) must be regarded as the final outcome. Somehow, we must work through the 
challenges (the symptoms of the crisis) and negate the unexpected negativity of sci-
ence, thus opening-up a more viable plateau of activity, where science and society 
may become reconciled again (M3).
In all the novels analysed in this monograph, the experience sooner or later 
emerges that scientific research may indeed entail potentially disruptive risks, so 
that scientific research should indeed count as an impossible profession, given the 
integrity challenges which researchers are facing and which seem impossible to 
solve. But this experience inevitably raises the question how the situation of paraly-
sis and deadlock (M2) may eventually be overcome (the negation of the negation: 
M3). In practice, this envisioned dialectical end-result (M3) may prove difficult to 
achieve however. The experience of science as an “impossible profession” may give 
rise to less optimal scenarios and may imply that scientists, exposed to (unsolv-
able?) integrity challenges, revert to questionable research practices or even mis-
conduct, in order to by-pass (rather than address) them.
Because of the decisive role of reflections on problematic experiences (the 
cocaine-case, the Irma-case, etc.) during the gestation and birth of psychoanalysis, 
as reflected by his dream life as well as by The Interpretation of Dreams (Freud 
1900/1942), it is remarkable perhaps that on a manifest level Freud speaks about 
research misconduct in a fairly cursory manner. In The Psychopathology of Everyday 
Life, Freud (1904/1941) discusses a case of unintentional plagiarism (“cryptomne-
sia”) he once experienced. After sharing with “a friend and colleague” (Fliess again, 
but his name is not mentioned) some ideas about the original bisexuality of human 
individuals, Fliess kindly reminds him that he had been discussing this same idea 
with him two and a half years earlier, when Freud had actually rejected it. Thus, he 
suffered a narcissistic insult: he was forced to give up his illusion of originality, but, 
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he adds: “Since then I have become more tolerant if I come upon one of the few 
ideas with which my name can be linked elsewhere in the medical literature, and I 
find that I have been given no credit for it” (1905/1941, p. 160). In other words, lack 
of acknowledgment (i.e. plagiarism) is the default rather than the exception.
Another key concept in Freudian epistemology is the concept of resistance as a 
mechanism of defence. From a psychoanalytical perspective, modern science opens 
up the closed circle (the Platonic cave) of everyday phenomenological experience, 
revealing a dynamic universe of immense proportions and complexity. For Lacan, 
the prescientific Aristotelian cosmos was basically a phantasy (Fink 2004, p. 148), 
revolving around the idea of a pre-established harmony between the world (the 
natural macro-cosmos) and the embodied soul (the human micro-cosmos). Modern 
science, however, relying on quantification and formalisation, gave rise to a uni-
verse in which human existence is increasingly de-centred and marginalised. This 
entails what Freud (1917/1947) refers to as a “narcissistic offence”. The egocentric 
ego (the human micro-cosmos, mirrored by the macro-cosmos) gives way to the 
marginalised subject of modern techno-science. Modern science represents an ini-
tially quite painful and distressing awakening, an epistemological birth trauma. 
Science disrupts the “poetry” of a traditional, pre-scientific world and invokes anxi-
ety and unease because it entails a diminution of humankind. The world of modern 
science is so large (in terms of space and time) that humans become trivialised. For 
Freud, this narcissistic offence explains the resistance against Copernican, 
Darwinian and other scientific revolutions, which not only confront us with the 
immensity of the universe but also, for instance, with the existence of a (potentially 
threatening) microbial world, both surrounding and pervading us. Psychoanalysis 
likewise represents a narcissistic insult, by revealing that the ego is not the master in 
his own house, but driven by unconscious desires and hampered by unconscious 
obstacles.
To ward off the unease triggered by scientific revelations, there is an inherent 
inclination in human beings to ignore such threats. In Beyond the pleasure principle, 
Freud (1920/1940) argues that, in contrast to views which emphasise human curios-
ity and world-openness, the human psyche basically functions as an immunisation 
mechanism: a mechanism of defence, designed to keep the threatening outside 
world at bay. Although our sense organs allegedly allow us to see and hear the 
world, their primary task is to ward off and filter disconcerting external signals, 
allowing only small samples of reality to enter our sensory system. They filter out 
the information we need and disregard the rest. Indeed, we are equipped with eyes 
and ears first and foremost because they allow us not to see and not to hear (Matthew 
13:13).
This is underscored by human anatomy. We are almost completely covered by 
protective skin, in combination with artificial protective layers known as cloths. Our 
sense organs are miniature apertures, Freud (1920/1940) argues, whose primary 
purpose is to provide protection against overstimulation (Reizschutz). This tendency 
of humans and other organisms to insulate themselves from the outside world 
already applies to micro-organisms, coaxed inside their cell membranes. First and 
foremost, our vulnerable bodies have to be protected against overstimulation. 
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Protection against external stimuli is a life task at least as important as sensitivity 
and receptivity (Freud 1920/1940, p. 27). Our sense organs are like little antennae 
that select small samples of exteriority, allowing us to assess minute quantities of 
reality. Our primary objective is to safeguard our psychic integrity from external 
traumas. And this also explains obstinate human reluctance to accept the insights 
(fairly disconcerting and unsettling at times) produced by scientific research.
In the next chapter I will explain how Jacques Lacan coagulated Hegelian dialec-
tics and Freudian psychoanalysis into a theoretical and methodological framework 
which allows us to use science novels as oblique windows into contemporary 
technoscience.
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